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Network Working Group                                       N. Brownlee
Request for Comments: 2350                   The University of Auckland
BCP: 21                                                      E. Guttman
Category: Best Current Practice                        Sun Microsystems
							      June 1998


	  Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the
   Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   The purpose of this document is to express the general Internet
   community's expectations of Computer Security Incident Response Teams
   (CSIRTs). It is not possible to define a set of requirements that
   would be appropriate for all teams, but it is possible and helpful to
   list and describe the general set of topics and issues which are of
   concern and interest to constituent communities.

   CSIRT constituents have a legitimate need and right to fully
   understand the policies and procedures of 'their' Computer Security
   Incident Response Team.  One way to support this understanding is to
   supply detailed information which users may consider, in the form of
   a formal template completed by the CSIRT.  An outline of such a
   template and a filled in example are provided.

Table of Contents

   1 Introduction ....................................................2
   2 Scope............................................................4
     2.1 Publishing CSIRT Policies and Procedures ....................4
     2.2 Relationships between different CSIRTs ......................5
     2.3 Establishing Secure Communications ..........................6
   3 Information, Policies and Procedures.............................7
     3.1 Obtaining the Document.......................................8
     3.2 Contact Information .........................................9
     3.3 Charter ....................................................10
	 3.3.1 Mission Statement.....................................10
	 3.3.2 Constituency..........................................10



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	 3.3.3 Sponsoring Organization / Affiliation.................11
	 3.3.4 Authority.............................................11
     3.4 Policies ...................................................11
	 3.4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support...............11
	 3.4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of
	       Information...........................................12
	 3.4.3 Communication and Authentication......................14
     3.5 Services ...................................................15
	 3.5.1 Incident Response ....................................15
	       3.5.1.1 Incident Triage ..............................15
	       3.5.1.2 Incident Coordination ........................15
	       3.5.1.3 Incident Resolution...........................16
	 3.5.2 Proactive Activities .................................16
     3.6 Incident Reporting Forms ...................................16
     3.7 Disclaimers ................................................17
   Appendix A: Glossary of Terms ....................................18
   Appendix B: Related Material .....................................20
   Appendix C: Known Computer Security Incident Response Teams ......21
   Appendix D: Outline for CSIRT Template ...........................22
   Appendix E: Example - 'filled-in' Template for a CSIRT ...........23
   4 Acknowlegements ................................................36
   5 References .....................................................36
   6 Security Considerations ........................................36
   7 Authors' Addresses .............................................37
   8 Full Copyright Statement .......................................38

1 Introduction

   The GRIP Working Group was formed to create a document that describes
   the community's expectations of computer security incident response
   teams (CSIRTs).  Although the need for such a document originated in
   the general Internet community, the expectations expressed should
   also closely match those of more restricted communities.

   In the past there have been misunderstandings regarding what to
   expect from CSIRTs.  The goal of this document is to provide a
   framework for presenting the important subjects (related to incident
   response) that are of concern to the community.

   Before continuing, it is important to clearly understand what is
   meant by the term "Computer Security Incident Response Team."  For
   the purposes of this document, a CSIRT is a team that performs,
   coordinates, and supports the response to security incidents that
   involve sites within a defined constituency (see Appendix A for a
   more complete definition).  Any group calling itself a CSIRT for a
   specific constituency must therefore react to reported security
   incidents, and to threats to "their" constituency in ways which the
   specific community agrees to be in its general interest.



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   Since it is vital that each member of a constituent community be able
   to understand what is reasonable to expect of their team, a CSIRT
   should make it clear who belongs to their constituency and define the
   services the team offers to the community. Additionally, each CSIRT
   should publish its policies and operating procedures. Similarly,
   these same constituents need to know what is expected of them in
   order for them to receive the services of their team.  This requires
   that the team also publish how and where to report incidents.

   This document details a template which will be used by CSIRTs to
   communicate this information to their constituents.  The constituents
   should certainly expect a CSIRT to provide the services they describe
   in the completed template.

   It must be emphasized that without active participation from users,
   the effectiveness of the CSIRT's services can be greatly diminished.
   This is particularly the case with reporting.  At a minimum, users
   need to know that they should report security incidents, and know how
   and to where they should report them.

   Many computer security incidents originate outside local community
   boundaries and affect inside sites, others originate inside the local
   community and affect hosts or users on the outside.  Often,
   therefore, the handling of security incidents will involve multiple
   sites and potentially multiple CSIRTs.  Resolving these incidents
   will require cooperation between individual sites and CSIRTs, and
   between CSIRTs.

   Constituent communities need to know exactly how their CSIRT will be
   working with other CSIRTs and organizations outside their
   constituency, and what information will be shared.

   The rest of this document describes the set of topics and issues that
   CSIRTs need to elaborate for their constituents. However, there is no
   attempt to specify the "correct" answer to any one topic area.
   Rather, each topic is discussed in terms of what that topic means.

   Chapter two provides an overview of three major areas:  the
   publishing of information by a response team, the definition of the
   response team's relationship to other response teams, and the need
   for secure communications.  Chapter three describes in detail all the
   types of information that the community needs to know about their
   response team.

   For ease of use by the community, these topics are condensed into an
   outline template found in Appendix D.  This template can be used by
   constituents to elicit information from their CSIRT.




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   It is the working group's sincere hope that through clarification of
   the topics in this document, understanding between the community and
   its CSIRTs will be increased.

2 Scope

   The interactions between an incident response team and its
   constituent community response team require first that the community
   understand the policies and procedures of the response team. Second,
   since many response teams collaborate to handle incidents, the
   community must also understand the relationship between their
   response team and other teams.  Finally, many interactions will take
   advantage of existing public infrastructures, so the community needs
   to know how those communications will be protected. Each of these
   subjects will be described in more detail in the following three
   sections.

2.1 Publishing CSIRT Policies and Procedures

   Each user who has access to a Computer Security Incident Response
   Team should know as much as possible about the services of and
   interactions with this team long before he or she actually needs
   them.

   A clear statement of the policies and procedures of a CSIRT helps the
   constituent understand how best to report incidents and what support
   to expect afterwards.  Will the CSIRT assist in resolving the
   incident?   Will it provide help in avoiding incidents in the future?
   Clear expectations, particularly of the limitations of the services
   provided by a CSIRT, will make interaction with it more efficient and
   effective.

   There are different kinds of response teams: some have very broad
   constituencies (e.g., CERT Coordination Center and the Internet),
   others have more bounded constituencies (e.g., DFN-CERT, CIAC), and
   still others have very restricted constituencies (e.g., commercial
   response teams, corporate response teams).  Regardless of the type of
   response team, the constituency supported by it must be knowledgeable
   about the team's policies and procedures. Therefore, it is mandatory
   that response teams publish such information to their constituency.

   A CSIRT should communicate all necessary information about its
   policies and services in a form suitable to the needs of its
   constituency.  It is important to understand that not all policies
   and procedures need be publicly available.  For example, it is not
   necessary to understand the internal operation of a team in order to
   interact with it, as when reporting an incident or receiving guidance
   on how to analyze or secure one's systems.



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   In the past, some teams supplied a kind of Operational Framework,
   others provided a Frequently Asked Questions list (FAQ), while still
   others wrote papers for distribution at user conferences or sent
   newsletters.

   We recommend that each CSIRT publish its guidelines and procedures on
   its own information server (e.g. a World Wide Web server).  This
   would allow constituents to easily access it, though the problem
   remains of how a constituent can find his or her team; people within
   the constituency have to discover that there is a CSIRT "at their
   disposal."

   It is foreseen that completed CSIRT templates will soon become
   searchable by modern search engines,  which will aid in distributing
   information about the existence of CSIRTs and basic information
   required to approach them.

   It would be very useful to have a central repository containing all
   the completed CSIRT templates.  No such repository exists at the time
   of writing, though this might change in the future.

   Regardless of the source from which the information is retrieved, the
   user of the template must check its authenticity.  It is highly
   recommended that such vital documents be protected by digital
   signatures.  These will allow the user to verify that the template
   was indeed published by the CSIRT and that it has not been tampered
   with. This document assumes the reader is familiar with the proper
   use of digital signatures to determine whether a document is
   authentic.

2.2 Relationships between different CSIRTs

   In some cases a CSIRT may be able to operate effectively on its own
   and in close cooperation with its constituency.  But with today's
   international networks it is much more likely that most of the
   incidents handled by a CSIRT will involve parties external to its
   constituency.  Therefore the team will need to interact with other
   CSIRTs and sites outside its constituency.

   The constituent community should understand the nature and extent of
   this collaboration, as very sensitive information about individual
   constituents may be disclosed in the process.

   Inter-CSIRT interactions could include asking other teams for advice,
   disseminating knowledge of problems, and working cooperatively to
   resolve a security incident affecting one or more of the CSIRTs'
   constituencies.




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   In establishing relationships to support such interactions, CSIRTs
   must decide what kinds of agreements can exist between them so as to
   share yet safeguard information, whether this relationship can be
   disclosed, and if so to whom.

   Note that there is a difference between a peering agreement, where
   the CSIRTs involved agree to work together and share information, and
   simple co-operation, where a CSIRT (or any other organization) simply
   contacts another CSIRT and asks for help or advice.

   Although the establishment of such relationships is very important
   and affects the ability of a CSIRT to support its constituency, it is
   up to the teams involved to decide about the details.  It is beyond
   the scope of this document to make recommendations for this process.
   However, the same set of information used to set expectations for a
   user community regarding sharing of information will help other
   parties to understand the objectives and services of a specific
   CSIRT, supporting a first contact.

2.3 Establishing Secure Communications

   Once one party has decided to share information with another party,
   or two parties have agreed to share information or work together - as
   required for the coordination of computer security incident response
   - all parties involved need secure communications channels. (In this
   context, "secure" refers to the protected transmission of information
   shared between different parties, and not to the appropriate use of
   the information by the parties.)

   The goals of secure communication are:

      - Confidentiality:
	Can somebody else access the content of the communication?

      - Integrity:
	Can somebody else manipulate the content of the communication?

      - Authenticity:
	Am I communicating with the "right" person?

   It is very easy to send forged e-mail, and not hard to establish a
   (false) identity by telephone.    Cryptographic techniques, for
   example Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) can
   provide effective ways of securing e-mail.  With the correct
   equipment it is also possible to secure telephone communication. But
   before using such mechanisms, both parties need the "right"
   infrastructure, which is to say preparation in advance.  The most
   important preparation is ensuring the authenticity of the



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   cryptographic keys used in secure communication:

   - Public keys (for techniques like PGP and PEM):
     Because they are accessible through the Internet, public keys must
     be authenticated before use.  While PGP relies on a "Web of Trust"
     (where users sign the keys of other users), PEM relies on a
     hierarchy (where certification authorities sign the keys of users).

   - Secret keys (for techniques like DES and PGP/conventional
     encryption):  Because these must be known to both sender and
     receiver, secret keys must be exchanged before the communication
     via a secure channel.

   Communication is critical to all aspects of incident response.  A
   team can best support the use of the above-mentioned techniques by
   gathering all relevant information, in a consistent way.  Specific
   requirements (such as calling a specific number to check the
   authenticity of keys) should be clear from the start.  CSIRT
   templates provide a standardized vehicle for delivering this
   information.

   It is beyond the scope of this document to address the technical and
   administrative problems of secure communications.  The point is that
   response teams must support and use a method to secure the
   communications between themselves and their constituents (or other
   response teams).  Whatever the mechanism is, the level of protection
   it provides must be acceptable to the constituent community.

3 Information, Policies and Procedures

   In chapter 2 it was mentioned that the policies and procedures of a
   response team need to be published to their constituent community.
   In this chapter we will list all the types of information that the
   community needs to receive from its response team.  How this
   information is communicated to a community will differ from team to
   team, as will the specific information content.  The intent here is
   to clearly describe the various kinds of information that a
   constituent community expects from its response team.

   To make it easier to understand the issues and topics relevant to the
   interaction of constituents with "their" CSIRT, we suggest that a
   CSIRT publish all information, policies, and procedures addressing
   its constituency as a document, following the template given in
   Appendix D.  The template structure arranges items, making it easy to
   supply specific information; in Appendix E we provide an example of a
   filled-out template for the fictitious XYZ University.  While no
   recommendations are made as to what a CSIRT should adopt for its
   policy or procedures, different possibilities are outlined to give



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   some examples.  The most important thing is that a CSIRT have a
   policy and that those who interact with the CSIRT be able to obtain
   and understand it.

   As always, not every aspect for every environment and/or team can be
   covered.  This outline should be seen as a suggestion.  Each team
   should feel free to include whatever they think is necessary to
   support its constituency.

3.1 Obtaining the Document

   Details of a CSIRT change with time, so the completed template must
   indicate when it was last changed.  Additionally, information should
   be provided concerning how to find out about future updates. Without
   this, it is inevitable that misunderstandings and misconceptions will
   arise over time; outdated documents can do more harm than good.

   - Date of last update         This should be sufficient to allow
				 anyone interested to evaluate the
				 currency of the template.

   - Distribution list           Mailing lists are a convenient
				 mechanism to distribute up-to-date
				 information to a large number of
				 users.  A team can decide to use its
				 own or an already existing list to
				 notify users whenever the document
				 changes.  The list might normally be
				 groups the CSIRT has frequent
				 interactions with.

				 Digital signatures should be used
				 for update messages sent by a CSIRT.

   - Location of the document    The location where a current version
				 of the document is accessible through
				 a team's online information services.
				 Constituents can then easily learn
				 more about the team and check for
				 recent updates.  This online version
				 should also be accompanied by a
				 digital signature.









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3.2 Contact Information

   Full details of how to contact the CSIRT should be listed here,
   although this might be very different for different teams; for
   example, some might choose not to publicize the names of their team
   members. No further clarification is given when the meaning of the
   item can be assumed.

   - Name of the CSIRT

   - Mailing Address

   - Time zone                   This is useful for coordinating
				 incidents which cross time zones.

   - Telephone number

   - Facsimile number

   - Other telecommunication     Some teams might provide secure
				 voice communication (e.g. STU III).

   - Electronic mail address

   - Public keys and encryption  The use of specific techniques
				 depends on the ability of the
				 communication partners to have
				 access to programs, keys and so on.
				 Relevant information should be
				 given to enable users to determine
				 if and how they can make use of
				 encrypted communication while
				 interacting with the CSIRT.
   - Team members

   - Operating Hours             The operating hours and holiday
				 schedule should be provided here.
				 Is there a 24 hour hotline?

   - Additional Contact Info     Is there any specific customer
				 contact info?

   More detailed contact information can be provided.  This might
   include different contacts for different services, or might be a list
   of online information services.  If specific procedures for access to
   some services exist (for example addresses for mailing list
   requests), these should be explained here.




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3.3 Charter

   Every CSIRT must have a charter which specifies what it is to do, and
   the authority under which it will do it.  The charter should include
   at least the following items:

   - Mission statement
   - Constituency
   - Sponsorship / affiliation
   - Authority

3.3.1 Mission Statement

   The mission statement should focus on the team's core activities,
   already stated in the definition of a CSIRT.  In order to be
   considered a Computer Security Incident Response Team, the team must
   support the reporting of incidents and support its constituency by
   dealing with incidents.

   The goals and purposes of a team are especially important, and
   require clear, unambiguous definition.

3.3.2 Constituency

   A CSIRT's constituency can be determined in any of several ways. For
   example it could be a company's employees or its paid subscribers, or
   it could be defined in terms of a technological focus, such as the
   users of a particular operating system.

   The definition of the constituency should create a perimeter around
   the group to whom the team will provide service.  The policy section
   of the document (see below) should explain how requests from outside
   this perimeter will be handled.

   If a CSIRT decides not to disclose its constituency, it should
   explain the reasoning behind this decision. For example, for-fee
   CSIRTs will not list their clients but will declare that they provide
   a service to a large group of customers that are kept confidential
   because of the clients' contracts.

   Constituencies might overlap, as when an ISP provides a CSIRT which
   delivers services to customer sites that also have CSIRTs.  The
   Authority section of the CSIRT's description (see below) should make
   such relationships clear.







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3.3.3 Sponsoring Organization / Affiliation

   The sponsoring organization, which authorizes the actions of the
   CSIRT, should be given next.   Knowing this will help the users to
   understand the background and set-up of the CSIRT, and it is vital
   information for building trust between a constituent and a CSIRT.

3.3.4 Authority

   This section will vary greatly from one CSIRT to another, based on
   the relationship between the team and its constituency.   While an
   organizational CSIRT will be given its authority by the management of
   the organization, a community CSIRT will be supported and chosen by
   the community, usually in a advisory role.

   A CSIRT may or may not have the authority to intervene in the
   operation of all of the systems within its perimeter.  It should
   identify the scope of its control as distinct from the perimeter of
   its constituency.  If other CSIRTs operate hierarchically within its
   perimeter, this should be mentioned here, and the related CSIRTs
   identified.

   Disclosure of a team's authority may expose it to claims of
   liability.  Every team should seek legal advice on these matters.
   (See section 3.7 for more on liability.)

3.4 Policies

   It is critical that Incident Response Teams define their policies.
   The following sections discuss communication of these policies to the
   constituent community.

3.4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support

   The types of incident which the team is able to address, and the
   level of support which the team will offer when responding to each
   type of incident, should be summarized here in list form.  The
   Services section (see below) provides the opportunity to give more
   detailed descriptions, and to address non-incident-related topics.

   The level of support may change depending on factors such as the
   team's workload and the completeness of the information available.
   Such factors should be outlined and their impact should be explained.
   As a list of known types of incidents will be incomplete with regard
   to possible or future incidents, a CSIRT should also give some
   background on the "default" support for incident types not otherwise
   mentioned.




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   The team should state whether it will act on information it receives
   about vulnerabilities which create opportunities for future
   incidents.  A commitment to act on such information on behalf of its
   constituency is regarded as an optional proactive service policy
   rather than a core service requirement for a CSIRT.

3.4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information

   This section should make explicit which related groups the CSIRT
   routinely interacts with.  Such interactions are not necessarily
   related to the computer security incident response provided, but are
   used to facilitate better cooperation on technical topics or
   services.  By no means need details about cooperation agreements be
   given out; the main objective of this section is to give the
   constituency a basic understanding of what kind of interactions are
   established and what their purpose is.

   Cooperation between CSIRTs can be facilitated by the use of unique
   ticket number assignment combined with explicit handoff procedures.
   This reduces the chance of misunderstandings, duplications of effort,
   assists in incident tracking and prevents 'loops' in communication.

   The reporting and disclosure policy should make clear who will be the
   recipients of a CSIRT's report in each circumstance.  It should also
   note whether the team will expect to operate through another CSIRT or
   directly with a member of another constituency over matters
   specifically concerning that member.

   Related groups a CSIRT will interact with are listed below:

   Incident Response Teams:
      A CSIRT will often need to interact with other CSIRTs.  For
      example a CSIRT within a large company may need to report
      incidents to a national CSIRT, and a national CSIRT may need to
      report incidents to national CSIRTs in other countries to deal
      with all sites involved in a large-scale attack.

      Collaboration between CSIRTs may lead to disclosure of
      information.  The following are examples of such disclosure, but
      are not intended to be an exhaustive list:

       - Reporting incidents within the constituency to other teams.
	 If this is done, site-related information may become public
	 knowledge, accessible to everyone, in particular the press.

       - Handling incidents occurring within the constituency, but
	 reported from outside it (which implies that some information
	 has already been disclosed off-site).



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       - Reporting observations from within the constituency indicating
	 suspected or confirmed incidents outside it.

       - Acting on reports of incidents from outside the constituency.

       - Passing information about vulnerabilities to vendors, to
	 partner CSIRTs or directly to affected sites lying within or
	 outside the constituency.

       - Feedback to parties reporting incidents or vulnerabilities.

       - The provision of contact information relating to members of
	 the constituency, members of other constituencies, other
	 CSIRTs, or law-enforcement agencies.

   Vendors:
      Some vendors have their own CSIRTs, but some vendors may not.  In
      such cases a CSIRT will need to work directly with a vendor to
      suggest improvements or modifications, to analyze the technical
      problem or to test provided solutions.  Vendors play a special
      role in handling an incident if their products' vulnerabilities
      are involved in the incident.

   Law-enforcement agencies:
      These include the police and other investigative agencies.  CSIRTs
      and users of the template should be sensitive to local laws and
      regulations, which may vary considerably in different countries.
      A CSIRT might advise on technical details of attacks or seek
      advice on the legal implications of an incident. Local laws and
      regulations may include specific reporting and confidentiality
      requirements.

   Press:
      A CSIRT may be approached by the press for information and comment
      from time to time.

      An explicit policy concerning disclosure to the press can be
      helpful, particularly in clarifying the expectations of a CSIRT's
      constituency.  The press policy will have to clarify the same
      topics as above more specifically, as the constituency will
      usually be very sensitive to press contacts.

   Other:
      This might include research activities or the relation to the
      sponsoring organization.






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   The default status of any and all security-related information which
   a team receives will usually be 'confidential,' but rigid adherence
   to this makes the team to appear to be an informational 'black hole,'
   which may reduce the likelihood of the team's obtaining cooperation
   from clients and from other organizations.  The CSIRT's template
   should define what information it will report or disclose, to whom,
   and when.

   Different teams are likely to be subject to different legal
   restraints requiring or limiting disclosure, especially if they work
   in different jurisdictions.  In addition, they may have reporting
   requirements imposed by their sponsoring organization.  Each team's
   template should specify any such constraints, both to clarify users'
   expectations and to inform other teams.

   Conflicts of interest, particularly in commercial matters, may also
   restrain disclosure by a team; this document does not recommend on
   how such conflicts should be addressed.

   A team will normally collect statistics.  If statistical information
   is distributed, the template's reporting and disclosure policy should
   say so, and should describe how to obtain such statistics.

3.4.3 Communication and Authentication

   You must have a policy which describes methods of secure and
   verifiable communication that you will use.  This is necessary for
   communication between CSIRTs and between a CSIRT and its
   constituents.  The template should include public keys or pointers to
   them, including key fingerprints, together with guidelines on how to
   use this information to check authenticity and how to deal with
   corrupted information (for example where to report this fact).

   At the moment it is recommended that as a minimum every CSIRT have
   (if possible), a PGP key available.  A team may also make other
   mechanisms available (for example PEM, MOSS, S/MIME), according to
   its needs and the needs of its constituents.   Note however, that
   CSIRTs and users should be sensitive to local laws and regulations.
   Some countries do not allow strong encryption, or enforce specific
   policies on the use of encryption technology.  In addition to
   encrypting sensitive information whenever possible, correspondence
   should include digital signatures.  (Please note that in most
   countries, the protection of authenticity by using digital signatures
   is not affected by existing encryption regulations.)

   For communication via telephone or facsimile a CSIRT may keep secret
   authentication data for parties with whom they may deal, such as an
   agreed password or phrase.  Obviously, such secret keys must not be



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   published, though their existence may be.

3.5 Services

   Services provided by a CSIRT can be roughly divided into two
   categories: real-time activities directly related to the main task of
   incident response, and non-real-time proactive activities, supportive
   of the incident response task. The second category and part of the
   first category consist of services which are optional in the sense
   that not all CSIRTs will offer them.

3.5.1 Incident Response

   Incident response usually includes assessing incoming reports about
   incidents ("Incident Triage") and following up on these with other
   CSIRTs, ISPs and sites ("Incident Coordination"). A third range of
   services, helping a local site to recover from an incident ("Incident
   Resolution"), is comprised of typically optional services, which not
   all CSIRTs will offer.

3.5.1.1 Incident Triage

   Incident triage usually includes:

   - Report assessment           Interpretion of incoming incident
				 reports, prioritizing them, and
				 relating them to ongoing incidents
				 and trends.

   - Verification                Help in determining whether an
				 incident has really occurred, and
				 its scope.

3.5.1.2 Incident Coordination

   Incident Coordination normally includes:

   - Information categorization  Categorization of the incident related
				 information (logfiles, contact
				 information, etc.) with respect to
				 the information disclosure policy.

   - Coordination                Notification of other involved
				 parties on a need-to-know basis, as
				 per the information disclosure
				 policy.





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3.5.1.3 Incident Resolution

   Usually additional or optional, incident resolution services
   include:

   - Technical Assistance        This may include analysis of
				 compromised systems.

   - Eradication                 Elimination of the cause of a
				 security incident (the vulnerability
				 exploited), and its effects (for
				 example, continuing access to the
				 system by an intruder).

   - Recovery                    Aid in restoring affected systems
				 and services to their status before
				 the security incident.

3.5.2. Proactive Activities

   Usually additional or optional, proactive services might include:

   - Information provision       This might include an archive of
				 known vulnerabilities, patches or
				 resolutions of past problems, or
				 advisory mailing lists.

   - Security Tools              This may include tools for auditing
				 a Site's security.

   - Education and training

   - Product evaluation

   - Site security auditing and consulting

3.6 Incident Reporting Forms

   The use of reporting forms makes it simpler for both users and teams
   to deal with incidents.  The constituent can prepare answers to
   various important questions before he or she actually contacts the
   team, and can therefore come well prepared.  The team gets all the
   necessary information at once with the first report and can proceed
   efficiently.

   Depending on the objectives and services of a particular CSIRT,
   multiple forms may be used, for example a reporting form for a new
   vulnerability may be very different from the form used for reporting



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   incidents.

   It is most efficient to provide forms through the online information
   services of the team.  The exact pointers to them should be given in
   the CSIRT description document, together with statements about
   appropriate use, and guidelines for when and how to use the forms. If
   separate e-mail addresses are supported for form-based reporting,
   they should be listed here again.

   One example of such a form is the Incident Reporting Form provided by
   the CERT Coordination Center:

   - ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form

3.7 Disclaimers

   Although the CSIRT description document does not constitute a
   contract, liability may conceivably result from its descriptions of
   services and purposes.  The inclusion of a disclaimer at the end of
   the template is therefore recommended and should warn the user about
   possible limitations.

   In situations where the original version of a document must be
   translated into another language, the translation should carry a
   disclaimer and a pointer to the original.  For example:

      Although we tried to carefully translate the original document
      from German into English, we can not be certain that both
      documents express the same thoughts in the same level of detail
      and correctness.  In all cases, where there is a difference
      between both versions, the German version will prevail.

   The use of and protection by disclaimers is affected by local laws
   and regulations, of which each CSIRT should be aware. If in doubt the
   CSIRT should check the disclaimer with a lawyer.
















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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

   This glossary defines terms used in describing security incidents and
   Computer Security Incident Response Teams.  Only a limited list is
   included.  For more definitions please refer to other sources, for
   example to the Internet User's Glossary [RFC 1983].

   Constituency:
      Implicit in the purpose of a Computer Security Incident Response
      Team is the existence of a constituency.  This is the group of
      users, sites, networks or organizations served by the team.  The
      team must be recognized by its constituency in order to be
      effective.

   Security Incident:
      For the purpose of this document, this term is a synonym of
      Computer Security Incident: any adverse event which compromises
      some aspect of computer or network security.

      The definition of an incident may vary between organizations, but
      at least the following categories are generally applicable:

      - Loss of confidentiality of information.
      - Compromise of integrity of information.
      - Denial of service.
      - Misuse of service, systems or information.
      - Damage to systems.

      These are very general categories.  For instance the replacement
      of a system utility program by a Trojan Horse is an example of '
      compromise of integrity,' and a successful password attack is an
      example of 'loss of confidentiality.'  Attacks, even if they
      failed because of proper protection, can be regarded as Incidents.

      Within the definition of an incident the word 'compromised' is
      used.  Sometimes an administrator may only 'suspect' an incident.
      During the response it must be established whether or not an
      incident has really occurred.

   Computer Security Incident Response Team:
      Based on two of the definitions given above, a CSIRT is a team
      that coordinates and supports the response to security incidents
      that involve sites within a defined constituency.

      In order to be considered a CSIRT, a team must:

      - Provide a (secure) channel for receiving reports about
	suspected incidents.



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      - Provide assistance to members of its constituency in
	handling these incidents.
      - Disseminate incident-related information to its
	constituency and to other involved parties.

      Note that we are not referring here to police or other law
      enforcement bodies which may investigate computer-related crime.
      CSIRT members, indeed, need not have any powers beyond those of
      ordinary citizens.

   Vendor:
      A 'vendor' is any entity that produces networking or computing
      technology, and is responsible for the technical content of that
      technology.  Examples of 'technology' include hardware (desktop
      computers, routers, switches, etc.), and software (operating
      systems, mail forwarding systems, etc.).

      Note that the supplier of a technology is not necessarily the '
      vendor' of that technology.  As an example, an Internet Service
      Provider (ISP) might supply routers to each of its customers, but
      the 'vendor' is the manufacturer, since the manufacturer, rather
      than the ISP, is the entity responsible for the technical content
      of the router.

   Vulnerability:
      A 'vulnerability' is a characteristic of a piece of technology
      which can be exploited to perpetrate a security incident.  For
      example, if a program unintentionally allowed ordinary users to
      execute arbitrary operating system commands in privileged mode,
      this "feature" would be a vulnerability.





















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Appendix B: Related Material

   Important issues in responding to security incidents on a site level
   are contained in [RFC 2196], the Site Security Handbook, produced by
   the Site Security Handbook Working Group (SSH).  This document will
   be updated by the SSH working group and will give recommendations for
   local policies and procedures, mainly related to the avoidance of
   security incidents.

   Other documents of interest for the discussion of CSIRTs and their
   tasks are available by anonymous FTP. A collection can be found on:

   - ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/docs/csir/
     Please refer to file 01-README for further information about
     the content of this directory.

   Some especially interesting documents in relation to this document
   are as follows:

   - ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/cert-nl/docs/
     reports/R-92-01
     This report contains the Operational Framework of CERT-NL, the
     CSIRT of SURFnet (network provider in the Netherlands).

   - For readers interested in the operation of FIRST (Forum of
     Incident Response and Security Teams) more information is
     collected in Appendix C.

   - http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/news/incident.html
     This document leads to the NRL Incident Response Manual.

   - http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/team/kpk/certbib.html
     This document contains an annotated bibliography of available
     material, documents and files about the operation of CSIRTs
     with links to many of the referenced items.

   - ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form
     This Incident Reporting Form is provided by the CERT
     Coordination Center to gather incident information and to avoid
     additional delays caused by the need to request more detailed
     information from the reporting site.

   - http://www.cert.org/cert.faqintro.html
     A collection of frequently asked questions from the CERT
     Coordination Center.






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Appendix C: Known Computer Security Incident Response Teams

   Today, there are many different CSIRTs but no single source lists
   every team. Most of the major and long established teams (the first
   CSIRT was founded in 1988) are nowadays members of FIRST, the
   worldwide Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams.  At the time
   of writing, more than 55 teams are members (1 in Australia, 13 in
   Europe, all others in North America).  Information about FIRST can be
   found:

   - http://www.first.org/

   The current list of members is available also, with the relevant
   contact information and some additional information provided by the
   particular teams:

   - http://www.first.org/team-info/

   For CSIRTs which want to become members of this forum (please note
   that a team needs a sponsor - a team which is already a full member
   of FIRST - to be introduced), the following files contain more
   information:

   - http://www.first.org/about/op_frame.html
     The Operational Framework of FIRST.

   - http://www.first.org/docs/newmem.html
     Guidelines for teams which want to become members of FIRST.

   Many of the European teams, regardless of whether they are members
   of FIRST or not, are listed by countries on a page maintained by
   the German CSIRT:

   - http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/csir/europe/certs.html

   To learn about existing teams suitable to one's needs it is
   often helpful to ask either known teams or an Internet Service
   Provider for the "right" contact.













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Appendix D: Outline for CSIRT Template

   This outline summarizes in point form the issues addressed in this
   document, and is the recommended template for a CSIRT description
   document.  Its structure is designed to facilitate the communication
   of a CSIRT's policies, procedures, and other relevant information to
   its constituency and to outside organizations such as other CSIRTs. A
   'filled-in' example of this template is given as Appendix E.

      1.   Document Information
      1.1  Date of Last Update
      1.2  Distribution List for Notifications
      1.3  Locations where this Document May Be Found

      2.   Contact Information
      2.1  Name of the Team
      2.2  Address
      2.3  Time Zone
      2.4  Telephone Number
      2.5  Facsimile Number
      2.6  Other Telecommunication
      2.7  Electronic Mail Address
      2.8  Public Keys and Encryption Information
      2.9  Team Members
      2.10 Other Information
      2.11 Points of Customer Contact

      3.   Charter
      3.1  Mission Statement
      3.2  Constituency
      3.3  Sponsorship and/or Affiliation
      3.4  Authority

      4.   Policies
      4.1  Types of Incidents and Level of Support
      4.2  Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information
      4.3  Communication and Authentication

      5.   Services
      5.1  Incident Response
	   5.1.1. Incident Triage
	   5.1.2. Incident Coordination
	   5.1.3. Incident Resolution
      5.2  Proactive Activities

      6.   Incident Reporting Forms

      7.   Disclaimers



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Appendix E: Example - 'filled-in' Template for a CSIRT

   Below is an example of a filled-in template for a fictitious CSIRT
   called XYZ-CSIRT.  This text is for example purposes only, and does
   not constitute endorsement by the working group or the IETF of any
   particular set of procedures or policies.  While CSIRTs are welcome
   to use any or all of this text if they wish, such use is of course
   not mandatory, or even appropriate in most cases.

CSIRT Description for XYZ-CERT
-----------------------------

   1. About this document

   1.1 Date of Last Update

	This is version 1.01, published 1997/03/31.

   1.2 Distribution List for Notifications

	Notifications of updates are submitted to our mailing list
	<xyz-cert-info@xyz-univ.ca>.  Subscription requests for this
	list should be sent to the Majordomo at
	<xyz-cert-info-request@xyz-univ.ca>; the body of the message
	should consist of the word "subscribe".  Send the word "help"
	instead if you don't know how to use a Majordomo list manager.
	This mailing list is moderated.

   1.3 Locations where this Document May Be Found

	The current version of this CSIRT description document is
	available from the XYZ-CERT WWW site; its URL is
	  http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/english/CSIRT-descr.txt
	Une version francaise de ce document est igalement disponible:
	  http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/francais/CSIRT-descr.txt
	Please make sure you are using the latest version.

   1.4 Authenticating this Document

	Both the English and French versions of this document have
	been signed with the XYZ-CERT's PGP key.  The signatures are
	also on our Web site, under:
	  http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/english/CSIRT-descr.asc
	  http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/francais/CSIRT-descr.asc







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   2. Contact Information

   2.1 Name of the Team

	"XYZ-CERT": the XYZ University Computer Emergency Response
	Team.

   2.2 Address

	XYZ-CERT
	XYZ University, Computing Services Department
	12345 Rue Principale
	UniversityTown, Quebec
	Canada H0H 0H0

   2.3 Time Zone

	Canada/Eastern (GMT-0500, and GMT-0400 from April to October)

   2.4 Telephone Number

	+1 234 567 7890  (ask for the XYZ-CERT)

   2.5 Facsimile Number

	+1 234 567 7899  (this is *not* a secure fax)

   2.6 Other Telecommunication

	None available.

   2.7 Electronic Mail Address

	<xyz-cert@xyz-univ.ca>  This is a mail alias that relays mail
	to the human(s) on duty for the XYZ-CERT.

   2.8 Public Keys and Other Encryption Information

	The XYZ-CERT has a PGP key, whose KeyID is 12345678 and
	whose fingerprint is
	  11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88  88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11.
	The key and its signatures can be found at the usual large
	public keyservers.

	Because PGP is still a relatively new technology at XYZ
	University, this key still has relatively few signatures;
	efforts are underway to increase the number of links to this
	key in the PGP "web of trust".  In the meantime, since most



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	fellow universities in Quebec have at least one staff member
	who knows the XYZ-CERT coordinator Zoe Doe, Zoe Doe has
	signed the XYZ-CERT key, and will be happy to confirm its
	fingerprint and that of her own key to those people who know
	her, by telephone or in person.

   2.9 Team Members

	Zoe Doe of Computing Services is the XYZ-CERT coordinator.
	Backup coordinators and other team members, along with their
	areas of expertise and contact information, are listed in the
	XYZ-CERT web pages, at
	  http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/teamlist.html

	Management, liaison and supervision are provided by Steve Tree,
	Assistant Director (Technical Services), Computing Services.

   2.10 Other Information

	General information about the XYZ-CERT, as well as links to
	various recommended security resources, can be found at
	  http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/index.html

   2.11 Points of Customer Contact

	The preferred method for contacting the XYZ-CERT is via
	e-mail at <xyz-cert@xyz-univ.ca>; e-mail sent to this address
	will "biff" the responsible human, or be automatically
	forwarded to the appropriate backup person, immediately.  If
	you require urgent assistance, put "urgent" in your subject
	line.

	If it is not possible (or not advisable for security reasons)
	to use e-mail, the XYZ-CERT can be reached by telephone during
	regular office hours.  Telephone messages are checked less
	often than e-mail.

	The XYZ-CERT's hours of operation are generally restricted to
	regular business hours (09:00-17:00 Monday to Friday except
	holidays).

	If possible, when submitting your report, use the form
	mentioned in section 6.








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   3. Charter

   3.1 Mission Statement

	The purpose of the XYZ-CERT is, first, to assist members of XYZ
	University community in implementing proactive measures to
	reduce the risks of computer security incidents, and second, to
	assist XYZ community in responding to such incidents when they
	occur.

   3.2 Constituency

	The XYZ-CERT's constituency is the XYZ University community,
	as defined in the context of the "XYZ University Policy on
	Computing Facilities".  This policy is available at
	  http://www-compserv.xyz-univ.ca/policies/pcf.html

	However, please note that, notwithtanding the above, XYZ-CERT
	services will be provided for on-site systems only.

   3.3 Sponsorship and/or Affiliation

	The XYZ-CERT is sponsored by the ACME Canadian Research
	Network.  It maintains affiliations with various University
	CSIRTs throughout Canada and the USA on an as needed basis.

   3.4 Authority

	The XYZ-CERT operates under the auspices of, and with authority
	delegated by, the Department of Computing Services of XYZ
	University.  For further information on the mandate and
	authority of the Department of Computing Services, please
	refer to the XYZ University "Policy on Computing Facilities",
	available at
	  http://www-compserv.xyz-univ.ca/policies/pcf.html

	The XYZ-CERT expects to work cooperatively with system
	administrators and users at XYZ University, and, insofar as
	possible, to avoid authoritarian relationships.  However,
	should circumstances warrant it, the XYZ-CERT will appeal to
	Computing Services to exert its authority, direct or indirect,
	as necessary.  All members of the XYZ-CERT are members of the
	CCSA (Committee of Computer Systems Administrators), and have
	all of the powers and responsibilities assigned to Systems
	Administrators by the Policy on Computing Facilities, or are
	members of University management.





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	Members of the XYZ University community who wish to appeal the
	actions of the XYZ-CERT should contact the Assistant Director
	(Technical Services), Computing Services.  If this recourse is
	not satisfactory, the matter may be referred to the Director
	of Computing Services (in the case of perceived
	problems with existing policy), or to the XYZ University
	Office of Rights and Responsibilities (in the case of perceived
	errors in the application of existing policy).

   4. Policies

   4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support

	The XYZ-CERT is authorized to address all types of computer
	security incidents which occur, or threaten to occur, at
	XYZ University.

	The level of support given by XYZ-CERT will vary depending on
	the type and severity of the incident or issue, the type of
	constituent, the size of the user community affected, and the
	XYZ-CERT's resources at the time, though in all cases some
	response will be made within one working day.  Resources will
	be assigned according to the following priorities, listed in
	decreasing order:

	  - Threats to the physical safety of human beings.
	  - Root or system-level attacks on any Management Information
	    System, or any part of the backbone network infrastructure.
	  - Root or system-level attacks on any large public service
	    machine, either multi-user or dedicated-purpose.
	  - Compromise of restricted confidential service accounts or
	    software installations, in particular those used for MIS
	    applications containing confidential data, or those used
	    for system administration.
	  - Denial of service attacks on any of the above three items.
	  - Any of the above at other sites, originating from XYZ
	    University.
	  - Large-scale attacks of any kind, e.g. sniffing attacks,
	    IRC "social engineering" attacks, password cracking
	    attacks.
	  - Threats, harassment, and other criminal offenses
	    involving individual user accounts.
	  - Compromise of individual user accounts on multi-user
	    systems.
	  - Compromise of desktop systems.
	  - Forgery and misrepresentation, and other security-related
	    violations of local rules and regulations, e.g. netnews
	    and e-mail forgery, unauthorized use of IRC bots.



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	  - Denial of service on individual user accounts, e.g.
	    mailbombing.

	Types of incidents other than those mentioned above will be
	prioritized according to their apparent severity and extent.

	Note that no direct support will be given to end users; they
	are expected to contact their system administrator, network
	administrator, or department head for assistance.  The XYZ-CERT
	will support the latter people.

	While the XYZ-CERT understands that there exists great
	variation in the level of system administrator expertise at XYZ
	University, and while the XYZ-CERT will endeavor to present
	information and assistance at a level appropriate to each
	person, the XYZ-CERT cannot train system administrators on the
	fly, and it cannot perform system maintenance on their behalf.
	In most cases, the XYZ-CERT will provide pointers to the
	information needed to implement appropriate measures.

	The XYZ-CERT is committed to keeping the XYZ University system
	administration community informed of potential vulnerabilities,
	and where possible, will inform this community of such
	vulnerabilities before they are actively exploited.

   4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information

	While there are legal and ethical restrictions on the flow of
	information from XYZ-CERT, many of which are also outlined in
	the XYZ University Policy on Computing Facilities, and all of
	which will be respected, the XYZ-CERT acknowledges its
	indebtedness to, and declares its intention to contribute to,
	the spirit of cooperation that created the Internet.
	Therefore, while appropriate measures will be taken to protect
	the identity of members of our constituency and members of
	neighbouring sites where necessary, the XYZ-CERT will otherwise
	share information freely when this will assist others in
	resolving or preventing security incidents.

	In the paragraphs below, "affected parties" refers to the
	legitimate owners, operators, and users of the relevant
	computing facilities.  It does not refer to unauthorized
	users, including otherwise authorized users making
	unauthorized use of a facility; such intruders may have no
	expectation of confidentiality from the XYZ-CERT.  They may or
	may not have legal rights to confidentiality; such rights will
	of course be respected where they exist.




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	Information being considered for release will be classified as
	follows:

	  - Private user information is information about particular
	    users, or in some cases, particular applications, which
	    must be considered confidential for legal, contractual,
	    and/or ethical reasons.

	    Private user information will be not be released in
	    identifiable form outside the XYZ-CERT, except as provided
	    for below.  If the identity of the user is disguised, then
	    the information can be released freely (for example to show
	    a sample .cshrc file as modified by an intruder, or to
	    demonstrate a particular social engineering attack).

	  - Intruder information is similar to private user
	    information, but concerns intruders.

	    While intruder information, and in particular identifying
	    information, will not be released to the public (unless it
	    becomes a  matter of public record, for example because
	    criminal charges have been laid), it will be exchanged
	    freely with system administrators and CSIRTs tracking an
	    incident.

	  - Private site information is technical information about
	    particular systems or sites.

	    It will not be released without the permission of the site
	    in question, except as provided for below.

	  - Vulnerability information is technical information about
	    vulnerabilities or attacks, including fixes and
	    workarounds.

	    Vulnerability information will be released freely, though
	    every effort will be made to inform the relevant vendor
	    before the general public is informed.

	  - Embarrassing information includes the statement that an
	    incident has occurred, and information about its extent or
	    severity.  Embarrassing information may concern a site or
	    a particular user or group of users.

	    Embarrassing information will not be released without the
	    permission of the site or users in question, except as
	    provided for below.




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RFC 2350  Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response June 1998


	  - Statistical information is embarrassing information with
	    the identifying information stripped off.

	    Statistical information will be released at the discretion
	    of the Computing Services Department.

	  - Contact information explains how to reach system
	    administrators and CSIRTs.

	    Contact information will be released freely, except where
	    the contact person or entity has requested that this not
	    be the case, or where XYZ-CERT has reason to believe that
	    the dissemination of this information would not be
	    appreciated.

	Potential recipients of information from the XYZ-CERT will be
	classified as follows:

	- Because of the nature of their responsibilities and
	  consequent expectations of confidentiality, members of XYZ
	  University management are entitled to receive whatever
	  information is necessary to facilitate the handling of
	  computer security incidents which occur in their
	  jurisdictions.

	- Members of the Office of Rights and Responsibilities are
	  entitled to receive whatever information they request
	  concerning a computer security incident or related matter
	  which has been referred to them for resolution.  The same is
	  true for the XYZ Security Department, when its assistance in
	  an investigation has been enlisted, or when the investigation
	  has been instigated at its request.

	- System administrators at XYZ University who are members of
	  the CCSA are also, by virtue of their responsibilities,
	  trusted with confidential information.  However, unless such
	  people are also members of XYZ-CERT, they will be given only
	  that confidential information which they must have in order
	  to assist with an investigation, or in order to secure their
	  own systems.

	- Users at XYZ University are entitled to information which
	  pertains to the security of their own computer accounts,
	  even if this means revealing "intruder information", or
	  "embarrassing information" about another user.  For
	  example, if account aaaa is cracked and the intruder attacks
	  account bbbb, user bbbb is entitled to know that aaaa was
	  cracked, and how the attack on the bbbb account was



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	  executed.  User bbbb is also entitled, if she or he requests
	  it, to information about account aaaa which might enable
	  bbbb to investigate the attack.  For example, if bbbb was
	  attacked by someone remotely connected to aaaa, bbbb should
	  be told the provenance of the connections to aaaa, even
	  though this information would ordinarily be considered
	  private to aaaa.  Users at XYZ University are entitled to be
	  notified if their account is believed to have been
	  compromised.

	- The XYZ University community will receive no restricted
	  information, except where the affected parties have given
	  permission for the information to be disseminated.
	  Statistical information may be made available to the general
	  XYZ community.  There is no obligation on the part of the
	  XYZ-CERT to report incidents to the community, though it may
	  choose to do so; in particular, it is likely that the
	  XYZ-CERT will inform all affected parties of the ways in
	  which they were affected, or will encourage the affected site
	  to do so.

	- The public at large will receive no restricted information.
	  In fact, no particular effort will be made to communicate
	  with the public at large, though the XYZ-CERT recognizes
	  that, for all intents and purposes, information made
	  available to the XYZ University community is in effect made
	  available to the community at large, and will tailor the
	  information in consequence.

	- The computer security community will be treated the same way
	  the general public is treated.  While members of XYZ-CERT may
	  participate in discussions within the computer security
	  community, such as newsgroups, mailing lists (including the
	  full-disclosure list "bugtraq"), and conferences, they will
	  treat such forums as though they were the public at large.
	  While technical issues (including vulnerabilities) may be
	  discussed to any level of detail, any examples taken from
	  XYZ-CERT experience will be disguised to avoid identifying
	  the affected parties.

	- The press will also be considered as part of the general
	  public.  The XYZ-CERT will not interact directly with the
	  Press concerning computer security incidents, except to point
	  them toward information already released to the general
	  public.  If necessary, information will be provided to the
	  XYZ University Public Relations Department, and to the
	  Customer Relations group of the Computing Services
	  Department.  All incident-related queries will be referred to



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	  these two bodies.  The above does not affect the ability of
	  members of XYZ-CERT to grant interviews on general computer
	  security topics; in fact, they are encouraged to do to, as a
	  public service to the community.

	- Other sites and CSIRTs, when they are partners in the
	  investigation of a computer security incident, will in some
	  cases be trusted with confidential information.  This will
	  happen only if the foreign site's bona fide can be verified,
	  and the information transmitted will be limited to that which
	  is likely to be helpful in resolving the incident.  Such
	  information sharing is most likely to happen in the case of
	  sites well known to XYZ-CERT (for example, several other
	  Quebec universities have informal but well-established
	  working relationships with XYZ University in such matters).

	  For the purposes of resolving a security incident, otherwise
	  semi-private but relatively harmless user information such as
	  the provenance of connections to user accounts will not be
	  considered highly sensitive, and can be transmitted to a
	  foreign site without excessive precautions.  "Intruder
	  information" will be transmitted freely to other system
	  administrators and CSIRTs.  "Embarrassing information" can be
	  transmitted when there is reasonable assurance that it will
	  remain confidential, and when it is necessary to resolve an
	  incident.

	- Vendors will be considered as foreign CSIRTs for most intents
	  and purposes.  The XYZ-CERT wishes to encourage vendors of
	  all kinds of networking and computer equipment, software, and
	  services to improve the security of their products.  In aid
	  of this, a vulnerability discovered in such a product will be
	  reported to its vendor, along with all technical details
	  needed to identify and fix the problem.  Identifying details
	  will not be given to the vendor without the permission of the
	  affected parties.

	- Law enforcement officers will receive full cooperation from
	  the XYZ-CERT, including any information they require to
	  pursue an investigation, in accordance with the Policy on
	  Computing Facilities.

   4.3 Communication and Authentication

	In view of the types of information that the XYZ-CERT will
	likely be dealing with, telephones will be considered
	sufficiently secure to be used even unencrypted.  Unencrypted
	e-mail will not be considered particularly secure, but will be



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	sufficient for the transmission of low-sensitivity data.  If
	it is necessary to send highly sensitive data by e-mail, PGP
	will be used.  Network file transfers will be considered to
	be similar to e-mail for these purposes: sensitive data should
	be encrypted for transmission.

	Where it is necessary to establish trust, for example before
	relying on information given to the XYZ-CERT, or before
	disclosing confidential information, the identity and bona
	fide of the other party will be ascertained to a reasonable
	degree of trust.  Within XYZ University, and with known
	neighbor sites, referrals from known trusted people will
	suffice to identify someone.  Otherwise, appropriate methods
	will be used, such as a search of FIRST members, the use of
	WHOIS and other Internet registration information, etc, along
	with telephone call-back or e-mail mail-back to ensure that
	the party is not an impostor.  Incoming e-mail whose data must
	be trusted will be checked with the originator personally, or
	by means of digital signatures (PGP in particular is
	supported).

   5. Services

   5.1 Incident Response

	XYZ-CERT will assist system administrators in handling the
	technical and organizational aspects of incidents.  In
	particular, it will provide assistance or advice with respect
	to the following aspects of incident management:

   5.1.1 Incident Triage

	    - Investigating whether indeed an incident occured.
	    - Determining the extent of the incident.

   5.1.2 Incident Coordination

	    - Determining the initial cause of the incident
	      (vulnerability exploited).
	    - Facilitating contact with other sites which may be
	      involved.
	    - Facilitating contact with XYZ University Security and/or
	      appropriate law enforcement officials, if necessary.
	    - Making reports to other CSIRTs.
	    - Composing announcements to users, if applicable.






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   5.1.3 Incident Resolution

	    - Removing the vulnerability.
	    - Securing the system from the effects of the incident.
	    - Evaluating whether certain actions are likely to reap
	      results in proportion to their cost and risk, in
	      particular those actions aimed at an eventual prosecution
	      or disciplinary action: collection of evidence after the
	      fact, observation of an incident in progress, setting
	      traps for intruders, etc.
	    - Collecting evidence where criminal prosecution, or
	      University disciplinary action, is contemplated.

	In addition, XYZ-CERT will collect statistics concerning
	incidents which occur within or involve the XYZ University
	community, and will notify the community as necessary to
	assist it in protecting against known attacks.

	To make use of XYZ-CERT's incident response services, please
	send e-mail as per section 2.11 above.  Please remember that
	the amount of assistance available will vary according to
	the parameters described in section 4.1.

   5.2 Proactive Activities

	The XYZ-CERT coordinates and maintains the following
	services to the extent possible depending on its resources:
	  - Information services
	     - List of departmental security contacts, administrative
	       and technical.  These lists will be available to the
	       general public, via commonly-available channels such as
	       the World Wide Web and/or the Domain Name Service.
	     - Mailing lists to inform security contacts of new
	       information relevant to their computing environments.
	       These lists will be available only to XYZ University
	       system administrators.
	     - Repository of vendor-provided and other security-related
	       patches for various operating systems.  This repository
	       will be available to the general public wherever
	       license restrictions allow it, and will be provided via
	       commonly-available channels such as the World Wide Web
	       and/or ftp.
	     - Repository of security tools and documentation for
	       use by sysadmins.  Where possible, precompiled
	       ready-to-install versions will be supplied.  These will
	       be supplied to the general public via www or ftp as
	       above.




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	     - "Clipping" service for various existing resources, such
	       as major mailing lists and newsgroups.  The resulting
	       clippings will be made available either on the
	       restricted mailing list or on the web site, depending
	       on their sensitivity and urgency.
	  - Training services
	     - Members of the XYZ-CERT will give periodic seminars on
	       computer security related topics; these seminars will
	       be open to XYZ University system administrators.
	  - Auditing services
	     - Central file integrity checking service for Unix
	       machines, and for any other platforms capable of
	       running "tripwire".
	     - Security level assignments; machines and subnetworks
	       at XYZ University will be audited and assigned a
	       security level.  This security level information will be
	       available to the XYZ University community, to facilitate
	       the setting of appropriate access privileges.  However,
	       details of the security analyses will be confidential,
	       and available only to the concerned parties.
	  - Archiving services
	     - Central logging service for machines capable of
	       Unix-style remote logging.  Incoming log entries will
	       be watched by an automated log analysis program, and
	       events or trends indicative of a potential security
	       problem will be reported to the affected system
	       administrators.
	     - Records of security incidents handled will be kept.
	       While the records will remain confidential, periodic
	       statistical reports will be made available to the XYZ
	       University community.

	Detailed descriptions of the above services, along with
	instructions for joining mailing lists, downloading
	information, or participating in certain services such as the
	central logging and file integrity checking services, are
	available on the XYZ-CERT web site, as per section 2.10
	above.

   6. Incident Reporting Forms

	There are no local forms developed yet for reporting incidents
	to XYZ-CERT. If possible, please make use of the Incident
	Reporting Form of the CERT Coordination Center (Pittsburgh,
	PA).  The current version is available from:
	   ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form





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   7. Disclaimers

	While every precaution will be taken in the preparation of
	information, notifications and alerts, XYZ-CERT assumes no
	responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages
	resulting from the use of the information contained within.

4 Acknowlegdements

   The editors gratefully acknowledge the contributed material and
   editorial scrutiny of Anne Bennett.   Thanks also to Don Stikvoort
   for assistance reworking the description of Incident Response Team
   services.

5 References

   [RFC 2196] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", FYI 8, RFC 2196,
   September 1997.

   [RFC 1983] Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18, RFC 1983,
   August 1996.

6 Security Considerations

   This document discusses the operation of Computer Security Incident
   Response Teams, and the teams' interactions with their constituencies
   and with other organizations.  It is, therefore, not directly
   concerned with the security of protocols, applications, or network
   systems themselves.  It is not even concerned with particular
   responses and reactions to security incidents, but only with the
   appropriate description of the responses provided by CSIRTs.

   Nonetheless, it is vital that the CSIRTs themselves operate securely,
   which means that they must establish secure communication channels
   with other teams, and with members of their constituency.  They must
   also secure their own systems and infrastructure, to protect the
   interests of their constituency and to maintain the confidentiality
   of the identity of victims and reporters of security incidents.













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7 Authors' Addresses

   Nevil Brownlee
   ITSS Technology Development
   The University of Auckland

   Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x8941
   EMail: n.brownlee@auckland.ac.nz


   Erik Guttman
   Sun Microsystems, Inc.
   Bahnstr. 2
   74915 Waibstadt Germany

   Phone: +49 7263 911484
   EMail: Erik.Guttman@sun.com


































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8 Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.






















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