562 lines
18 KiB
Text
Executable file
562 lines
18 KiB
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Executable file
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Network Working Group D. Brezinski
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Request for Comments: 3227 In-Q-Tel
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BCP: 55 T. Killalea
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Category: Best Current Practice neart.org
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February 2002
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Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
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Status of this Memo
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This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the
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Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
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improvements. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
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Copyright Notice
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
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Abstract
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A "security incident" as defined in the "Internet Security Glossary",
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RFC 2828, is a security-relevant system event in which the system's
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security policy is disobeyed or otherwise breached. The purpose of
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this document is to provide System Administrators with guidelines on
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the collection and archiving of evidence relevant to such a security
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incident.
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If evidence collection is done correctly, it is much more useful in
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apprehending the attacker, and stands a much greater chance of being
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admissible in the event of a prosecution.
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Table of Contents
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1 Introduction.................................................... 2
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1.1 Conventions Used in this Document........................... 2
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2 Guiding Principles during Evidence Collection................... 3
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2.1 Order of Volatility......................................... 4
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2.2 Things to avoid............................................. 4
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2.3 Privacy Considerations...................................... 5
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2.4 Legal Considerations........................................ 5
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3 The Collection Procedure........................................ 6
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3.1 Transparency................................................ 6
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3.2 Collection Steps............................................ 6
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4 The Archiving Procedure......................................... 7
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4.1 Chain of Custody............................................ 7
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4.2 The Archive................................................. 7
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5 Tools you'll need............................................... 7
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 1]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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6 References...................................................... 8
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7 Acknowledgements................................................ 8
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8 Security Considerations......................................... 8
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9 Authors' Addresses.............................................. 9
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10 Full Copyright Statement.......................................10
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1 Introduction
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A "security incident" as defined in [RFC2828] is a security-relevant
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system event in which the system's security policy is disobeyed or
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otherwise breached. The purpose of this document is to provide
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System Administrators with guidelines on the collection and archiving
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of evidence relevant to such a security incident. It's not our
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intention to insist that all System Administrators rigidly follow
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these guidelines every time they have a security incident. Rather,
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we want to provide guidance on what they should do if they elect to
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collect and protect information relating to an intrusion.
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Such collection represents a considerable effort on the part of the
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System Administrator. Great progress has been made in recent years
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to speed up the re-installation of the Operating System and to
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facilitate the reversion of a system to a 'known' state, thus making
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the 'easy option' even more attractive. Meanwhile little has been
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done to provide easy ways of archiving evidence (the difficult
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option). Further, increasing disk and memory capacities and the more
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widespread use of stealth and cover-your-tracks tactics by attackers
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have exacerbated the problem.
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If evidence collection is done correctly, it is much more useful in
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apprehending the attacker, and stands a much greater chance of being
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admissible in the event of a prosecution.
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You should use these guidelines as a basis for formulating your
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site's evidence collection procedures, and should incorporate your
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site's procedures into your Incident Handling documentation. The
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guidelines in this document may not be appropriate under all
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jurisdictions. Once you've formulated your site's evidence
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collection procedures, you should have law enforcement for your
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jurisdiction confirm that they're adequate.
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1.1 Conventions Used in this Document
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The key words "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
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and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key
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words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 2]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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2 Guiding Principles during Evidence Collection
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- Adhere to your site's Security Policy and engage the
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appropriate Incident Handling and Law Enforcement personnel.
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- Capture as accurate a picture of the system as possible.
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- Keep detailed notes. These should include dates and times. If
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possible generate an automatic transcript. (e.g., On Unix
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systems the 'script' program can be used, however the output
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file it generates should not be to media that is part of the
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evidence). Notes and print-outs should be signed and dated.
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- Note the difference between the system clock and UTC. For each
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timestamp provided, indicate whether UTC or local time is used.
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- Be prepared to testify (perhaps years later) outlining all
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actions you took and at what times. Detailed notes will be
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vital.
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- Minimise changes to the data as you are collecting it. This is
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not limited to content changes; you should avoid updating file
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or directory access times.
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- Remove external avenues for change.
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- When confronted with a choice between collection and analysis
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you should do collection first and analysis later.
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- Though it hardly needs stating, your procedures should be
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implementable. As with any aspect of an incident response
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policy, procedures should be tested to ensure feasibility,
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particularly in a crisis. If possible procedures should be
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automated for reasons of speed and accuracy. Be methodical.
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- For each device, a methodical approach should be adopted which
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follows the guidelines laid down in your collection procedure.
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Speed will often be critical so where there are a number of
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devices requiring examination it may be appropriate to spread
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the work among your team to collect the evidence in parallel.
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However on a single given system collection should be done step
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by step.
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- Proceed from the volatile to the less volatile (see the Order
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of Volatility below).
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 3]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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- You should make a bit-level copy of the system's media. If you
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wish to do forensics analysis you should make a bit-level copy
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of your evidence copy for that purpose, as your analysis will
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almost certainly alter file access times. Avoid doing
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forensics on the evidence copy.
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2.1 Order of Volatility
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When collecting evidence you should proceed from the volatile to the
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less volatile. Here is an example order of volatility for a typical
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system.
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- registers, cache
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- routing table, arp cache, process table, kernel statistics,
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memory
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- temporary file systems
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- disk
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- remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the
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system in question
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- physical configuration, network topology
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- archival media
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2.2 Things to avoid
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It's all too easy to destroy evidence, however inadvertently.
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- Don't shutdown until you've completed evidence collection.
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Much evidence may be lost and the attacker may have altered the
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startup/shutdown scripts/services to destroy evidence.
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- Don't trust the programs on the system. Run your evidence
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gathering programs from appropriately protected media (see
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below).
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- Don't run programs that modify the access time of all files on
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the system (e.g., 'tar' or 'xcopy').
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 4]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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- When removing external avenues for change note that simply
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disconnecting or filtering from the network may trigger
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"deadman switches" that detect when they're off the net and
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wipe evidence.
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2.3 Privacy Considerations
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- Respect the privacy rules and guidelines of your company and
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your legal jurisdiction. In particular, make sure no
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information collected along with the evidence you are searching
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for is available to anyone who would not normally have access
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to this information. This includes access to log files (which
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may reveal patterns of user behaviour) as well as personal data
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files.
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- Do not intrude on people's privacy without strong
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justification. In particular, do not collect information from
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areas you do not normally have reason to access (such as
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personal file stores) unless you have sufficient indication
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that there is a real incident.
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- Make sure you have the backing of your company's established
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procedures in taking the steps you do to collect evidence of an
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incident.
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2.4 Legal Considerations
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Computer evidence needs to be
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- Admissible: It must conform to certain legal rules before it
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can be put before a court.
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- Authentic: It must be possible to positively tie evidentiary
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material to the incident.
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- Complete: It must tell the whole story and not just a
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particular perspective.
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- Reliable: There must be nothing about how the evidence was
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collected and subsequently handled that casts doubt about its
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authenticity and veracity.
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- Believable: It must be readily believable and understandable
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by a court.
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 5]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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3 The Collection Procedure
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Your collection procedures should be as detailed as possible. As is
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the case with your overall Incident Handling procedures, they should
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be unambiguous, and should minimise the amount of decision-making
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needed during the collection process.
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3.1 Transparency
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The methods used to collect evidence should be transparent and
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reproducible. You should be prepared to reproduce precisely the
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methods you used, and have those methods tested by independent
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experts.
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3.2 Collection Steps
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- Where is the evidence? List what systems were involved in the
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incident and from which evidence will be collected.
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- Establish what is likely to be relevant and admissible. When
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in doubt err on the side of collecting too much rather than not
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enough.
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- For each system, obtain the relevant order of volatility.
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- Remove external avenues for change.
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- Following the order of volatility, collect the evidence with
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tools as discussed in Section 5.
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- Record the extent of the system's clock drift.
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- Question what else may be evidence as you work through the
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collection steps.
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- Document each step.
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- Don't forget the people involved. Make notes of who was there
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and what were they doing, what they observed and how they
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reacted.
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Where feasible you should consider generating checksums and
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cryptographically signing the collected evidence, as this may make it
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easier to preserve a strong chain of evidence. In doing so you must
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not alter the evidence.
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 6]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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4 The Archiving Procedure
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Evidence must be strictly secured. In addition, the Chain of Custody
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needs to be clearly documented.
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4.1 Chain of Custody
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You should be able to clearly describe how the evidence was found,
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how it was handled and everything that happened to it.
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The following need to be documented
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- Where, when, and by whom was the evidence discovered and
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collected.
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- Where, when and by whom was the evidence handled or examined.
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- Who had custody of the evidence, during what period. How was
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it stored.
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- When the evidence changed custody, when and how did the
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transfer occur (include shipping numbers, etc.).
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4.2 Where and how to Archive
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If possible commonly used media (rather than some obscure storage
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media) should be used for archiving.
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Access to evidence should be extremely restricted, and should be
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clearly documented. It should be possible to detect unauthorised
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access.
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5 Tools you'll need
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You should have the programs you need to do evidence collection and
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forensics on read-only media (e.g., a CD). You should have prepared
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such a set of tools for each of the Operating Systems that you manage
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in advance of having to use it.
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Your set of tools should include the following:
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- a program for examining processes (e.g., 'ps').
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- programs for examining system state (e.g., 'showrev',
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'ifconfig', 'netstat', 'arp').
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- a program for doing bit-to-bit copies (e.g., 'dd', 'SafeBack').
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 7]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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- programs for generating checksums and signatures (e.g.,
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'sha1sum', a checksum-enabled 'dd', 'SafeBack', 'pgp').
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- programs for generating core images and for examining them
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(e.g., 'gcore', 'gdb').
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- scripts to automate evidence collection (e.g., The Coroner's
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Toolkit [FAR1999]).
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The programs in your set of tools should be statically linked, and
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should not require the use of any libraries other than those on the
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read-only media. Even then, since modern rootkits may be installed
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through loadable kernel modules, you should consider that your tools
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might not be giving you a full picture of the system.
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You should be prepared to testify to the authenticity and reliability
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of the tools that you use.
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6 References
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[FAR1999] Farmer, D., and W Venema, "Computer Forensics Analysis
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Class Handouts", http://www.fish.com/forensics/
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
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Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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[RFC2196] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", FYI 8, RFC 2196,
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September 1997.
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[RFC2350] Brownlee, N. and E. Guttman, "Expectations for Computer
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Security Incident Response", FYI 8, RFC 2350, June 1998.
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[RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", FYI 36, RFC
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2828, May 2000.
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7 Acknowledgements
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We gratefully acknowledge the constructive comments received from
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Harald Alvestrand, Byron Collie, Barbara Y. Fraser, Gordon Lennox,
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Andrew Rees, Steve Romig and Floyd Short.
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8 Security Considerations
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This entire document discuses security issues.
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 8]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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9 Authors' Addresses
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Dominique Brezinski
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In-Q-Tel
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1000 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 2900
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Arlington, VA 22209
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USA
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EMail: dbrezinski@In-Q-Tel.org
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Tom Killalea
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Lisi/n na Bro/n
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Be/al A/tha na Muice
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Co. Mhaigh Eo
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IRELAND
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Phone: +1 206 266-2196
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EMail: tomk@neart.org
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 9]
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RFC 3227 Evidence Collection and Archiving February 2002
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10. Full Copyright Statement
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
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This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
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others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
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or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
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and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
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kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
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included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
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document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
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the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
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Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
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developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
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copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
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followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
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English.
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
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revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
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This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
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"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
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TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Acknowledgement
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Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
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Internet Society.
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Brezinski & Killalea Best Current Practice [Page 10]
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